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1  INTRODUCTION
Demands expressed locally and internationally for the recognition of legal 
pluralism2 are bound to have an effect on the enforcement of personal law 
in South Africa, especially in the light of sections 15, 30, 31 and 39(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa3 (‘the Constitution’). 
In my view, one of the best definitions of legal pluralism comes from John 
Griffiths. He defines legal pluralism as follows: 
‘Legal pluralism is a concomitant of social pluralism: the legal organization of society 
is congruent with its social organization. “Legal pluralism” refers to the normative het-
erogeneity attendant upon the fact that social action always takes place in a context of 
multiple, overlapping ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ [a] situation of legal pluralism … 
is one in which law and legal institution are not all subsumable within one ‘system’ but 
have their sources in the self-regulatory activities of all multifarious social fields present, 
activities which may support, complement, ignore or frustrate one another …’4
Based on John Griffith’s definition of legal pluralism, this article rejects the 
premise that legal pluralism is recognised under South African law.5 In view of 
the non-recognition of religious legal systems as part of South African law, it can-
not be logically argued that South African law recognises legal pluralism.
1 Revised version of the paper presented at the annual Conference of the Congress of the Society of 
University Teachers of Law, University of Free State, January 2005.
2 In the context of this article, the words ‘legal pluralism’ has the same meaning as ‘legal diversity’.
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Article 27 of The International Covenant 
on Civil & Political Rights; See also The Universal Declaration of Human Rights G.A. Res. 217A, 
U.N. Doc. A/810,at 71 (1948). These instruments emphasise the need to recognise religious and 
linguistic communities’ rights to practise their culture, religion and customs free from unfair discrimi-
nation by governments and in certain circumstances, by individuals. 
4 Griffiths J ‘What is legal pluralism’ in Journal of Legal Pluralism (1986) NR 24 at 38–39. See also a 
similar definition by Sezgin Y ‘A new theory of legal pluralism: The case of Israeli religious courts’. 
Paper presented at the Association for Israel Studies, 19th Annual Meeting, April 27–29 2003, San 
Diego, CA at 6. See also Masaji C ‘Other phases of legal pluralism in the contemporary world’ Ratio 
Juris, Vol.11, No.3, September (1998) 228; Hooker M.B Legal Pluralism: An introduction to Colonial 
and Neo-Colonial Laws. (1975) 6.
5 For further arguments on this topic, see the discussion by Van Niekerk G ‘Legal pluralism’ in Bekker, 
Rautenbach & Goolam Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa 2nd ed (2006) 3-14. See also 
Van Niekerk G ‘The plurality of legal domains in South Africa: the state’s historical legislative intru-
sion into the Field of Urban Popular Justice and Customary Law’ in Scharf W & Nina D (eds) The 
other law: Non-state ordering in South Africa (2001).
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Legal pluralism refers to the legal system where people are allowed to freely 
decide and choose the law under which they want to be judged.6 This means 
that a legal system where people are judged by a system of ‘uniform law’ is 
contrary to the concept of legal pluralism. Therefore, it may be reasonably 
argued that the legal system in South Africa is based on legal parallelism, as 
opposed to legal pluralism.7 That is, the fact that African customary law is 
recognised alongside civil law, and no other personal law system has been 
given the same legal recognition, proves that there is no legal pluralism in 
South Africa. This is so despite the freedoms protected in the Constitution. 
At its very onset, the Constitution acknowledges that 
‘[w]e the people of South Africa … [b]elieve that South Africa belongs to all who live in 
it, united in our diversity. We, therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt 
this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to [h]eal the divisions of the 
past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights.’8 
The cornerstone of South Africa’s Constitution is the Bill of Rights. Given 
South Africa’s long history of colonialism, political and social discrimination, 
and following the political transformation that took place in the early 1990s, 
it is appropriate that all persons in the country should be able to choose 
under which systems of private law they want to be judged. That is, no par-
ticular personal systems should be given preferential treatment over others. 
This will guarantee the same legal treatment and recognition of personal legal 
systems other than African customary law. 
This article argues that despite the fact that everyone has a right to free-
dom of religion under section 15 of the Constitution, the section does not 
adequately afford people the right to practise their religions freely, as people 
would understand that right. That is, the freedom of religion clause should 
be interpreted in a manner that would guarantee linguistic and religious com-
munities the right to have their private law matters regulated in accordance 
with the personal laws of their choice, provided they do not conflict with the 
spirit and values of the Constitution.
In the context of this article, and considering the above definition of legal 
pluralism, personal law may be defined as a system of law recognised by a 
particular community as binding, either in accordance with the prescripts of a 
recognised religion, faith or rules of an established and recognised custom. 
In the last part of this article, a comparative analysis of foreign legal sys-
tems is undertaken in order to identify a suitable model concerning the incor-
poration of legal pluralism into South African law.
6 See generally chapter XXXVIII titled ‘Personal law’ in Gibbon E The decline and fall of the Roman 
Empire (1776) (available at www.panarchy.org/gibbon/law).
7 Note that sections 211 and 212 of the Constitution require that the courts must apply customary law. 
No specific mention is made concerning the application of religious law in a similar manner.
8 See generally the preamble to the Constitution.
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2   CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
Section 15(1) of the Constitution provides that: ‘everyone has the right to 
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion’. It is under-
standable that groups observing distinctive cultural and religious traditions 
should demand legal protection for their particular customs and systems of 
personal law, as long as their respective personal laws and customs do not 
violate other provisions of the Constitution.9 This is a right guaranteed by 
section 15(1) of the Constitution. The extent to which the right to freedom of 
religion is misunderstood and/or erroneously applied by the courts in matters 
concerning legal diversity in South Africa is discussed below. 
2.1  The extent of the right to freedom of religion
While section 15(1) guarantees the right of every person to belief or hold 
an opinion, subsection 15(3) clearly draws a distinction between freedom of 
belief, on the one hand, and the right to practise such belief or religion on the 
other. This section indirectly restricts the right of any person to practise his or 
her religion. Section 15(3)(a) reads: 
‘This section does not prevent legislation recognising (i) marriages concluded under any tradi-
tion, or a system of religious, personal or family law; or (ii) systems of personal and family law 
under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.’
Section 15(3)(a) is a negative right (as opposed to a positive right) because 
there is no compulsion on the part of the legislature to legally recognise reli-
gious practices and religious law. Instead, the legislature has a choice not to 
pass any law at all that will recognise religious practices or law. 
It is submitted that the Constitutional protection of ‘freedom of conscience, 
religion, thought, belief and opinion’ only protects the religious belief, but 
does not recognise the observance of the rules of the religion (that is, religious 
law). What is actually not protected by the section is the practice (that is, the 
conduct) associated with the observance of religious law. In most instances, 
belief and practice cannot be separated because belief leads to the practice 
based on that belief. For example, if a man and a woman belong to X religion, 
they have a constitutional right to believe in and belong to X religion, they 
may enter into a marriage in accordance with the rules of X religion.10 To 
marry in terms of X religion means that they actually put their religion into 
practice. However, if the marriage is in accordance with X religion, it may not 
be legally recognised in South Africa because it is not a civil marriage (that is, 
a marriage entered into in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Act 
25 of 1961). It is submitted that their marriage in accordance with X religion 
9 See s 15(3) (b) of the Constitution.
10 See s 30(1) of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 which reads: ‘In solemnizing any marriage any marriage 
officer designated under section 3 may follow the marriage formula usually observed by his religious 
denomination or organization if such marriage formula has been approved by the Minister …’. See 
also s 3(1) of the Marriage Act supra which reads: ‘The Minister and any officer in the public service 
authorized thereto by him may designate any minister of religion of, or any person holding a respon-
sible position in, any religious denomination or organization to be, so long as he is such a minister 
or occupies such position, a marriage officer for the purpose of solemnizing marriages according to 
Christian, Jewish or Mohammedan rites or the rites of any Indian religion’.
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should be legally recognised, where it does not violate any other provision of 
the Constitution.
As will be argued under Part 3 of this article, the Supreme Court of Appeal, in 
the case of Ismael v Ismael11, defined a civil marriage in accordance with Chris-
tian values, holding that the marriage law in South Africa is rooted in Christian-
ity, and that any marriage which did not comply with such values was invalid. 
2.2   The defect in section 15 of the Constitution
The problem is, however, that the distinction between the practice of one’s 
religion and the right of belief goes to the root of personal law. The Qur’an, for 
instance, provides that: 
‘To each among you, we have prescribed a law. And a clear way.’12
‘The hukm (rule, injunction, and prescription) belongs to God alone.’13
‘And it may happen that you dislike a thing which is good for you and that you like a thing 
that is bad for you. Allah knows but you do not know.’14
The above quote implies that, according to some religions, the lawmaking 
powers belong to God alone. Consequently, religion or belief and the law 
associated with that religion or belief are inseparable. Therefore, it may not 
be always religiously permissible to ignore religious legal rules in favour of 
secular law because this means that the individual would actually be violat-
ing his or her own religion. In the example given in 2.1 above, a man and 
woman whose religion is X, may not be religiously permitted to conclude their 
marriage according to Y religion because this would mean that they actually 
practise religion Y, which is a different religion – a religion that may be op-
posed to their own – and, therefore, considered sinful. Similarly, they may not 
conclude a civil marriage because it would be in conflict with their religious 
rules. Put differently, the right to freedom of religion in so far as the right to 
practise one’s religion is concerned, is rendered useless, because such a right 
is limited only to the protection ‘belief’ which inseparable from the ‘practice’ 
of that belief. It must be noted, however, that although the Marriage Act15 ap-
pears to be secular in nature, the courts have interpreted the Act in a manner 
that would legally invalidate all personal marriage laws that do not comply 
with the Christian faith, particularly, because of the requirement that all ‘civil 
marriages’ must be monogamous.16
Thus, the question is whether it is possible for a person to belong to a reli-
gious group, and to have the freedom of religion as guaranteed under section 
15 of the Constitution without the legal recognition and protection of the right 
to put that religion or opinion into practice? Obviously, a Muslim considers 
himself bound by Shari’ah without exceptions; a Jewish person is bound by 
the Torah; and a Hindu by the Vedas, and so on. In all these examples the 
11 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A)




16 Ismael v Ismael supra
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religious legal systems concerned are considered to be divine by all their 
respective members and, therefore, considered to be the supreme law of the 
religion concerned. In most religions, no exceptions can be made in favour of 
secular law or any other system of law that contradicts religious law.17
It is absurd to have any other interpretation of section 15 other than to 
conclude that section 15(1), read with sections 15(2) and 15(3), guarantee 
both the freedom of belief, and the freedom to practise that religion. This 
conclusion is based on two main reasons: Firstly, section 15(3) automatically 
prohibits any religious legal rule or practice of religion that violates any provi-
sion of the Constitution. Although this section seems unnecessary since it is 
the repetition of the supremacy clause in the Constitution, its purpose seems 
to be to ensure that the legislature will not codify unconstitutional religious 
law. The point is that this section obviously does not affect the Constitutional 
recognition of any religious belief or the practice of religious law that is not 
contrary to the Constitution.
Secondly, section 15(3) also seems unnecessary because it does not assist 
in the protection of religious freedom but simply provides that the Legislature 
may not be prevented by any other law from recognising systems of religious 
or personal law. That is, the correct interpretation of section 15 is that free-
dom of religious belief and freedom to practise any law associated with any 
such religion or belief, should be regarded as protected in the Constitution. 
Consequently, all aspects of religious law, such as Shari’ah, Hinduism, Jewish 
and Christian laws, and other personal laws, currently form part or should be 
regarded as forming part of the South African legal system where they are not 
inconsistent with Constitution. When interpreting common law, the courts 
should interpret section 15 to include both the right to freedom of belief, and 
the right to practise that belief. Any other interpretation will defeat the objec-
tives of the section. The current attitudes of the courts when interpreting sec-
tion 15 are discussed below. It is apparent that the courts are not in favour of 
adopting a liberal interpretation by protecting both belief and practice of that 
belief according to the principles of the relevant personal laws, even if those 
personal laws do not violate the Bill of Rights. 
3  THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS
If the above interpretation of freedom of religion in South Africa is correct, 
why do the South African courts continue to refuse to legally recognise and 
enforce religious law – in particular, to legally recognise religious marriages?18 
17 See for instance Isaiah 33:22: which provide that the Lord is our judge, lawgiver and king. See 
also Genesis 49:10 (This applies to both Christian and Jewish religions). See also Qur’an 2:216. 
Concerning the position under the Hindu law and religion, see generally Misra S ‘Sources of Law in 
Hindu and Muslim Jurisprudence – A Comparative study’ 10 & 11 Islamic & Comp. L.Q. 165 (1990-
1991).
18 See the following cases: Ismael v Ismael 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A); Seedat’s Executors v The Master 
(Natal) 1917 AD 302; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1999 (4) SA (SCA); Ryland 
v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (C); Daniels v Campbell and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC); Kalla and 
Another v The Master and Others 1994 (4) BCLR 79 (T); Pillai v Pillai 1963 (1) SA 542 (D); Moola & 
Others v Aulsebrook & Others 1983 (1) SA 687 (N); Ramayee v Vandiyar 1977 (3) SA (D); S v Venget-
samy 1972 (4) SA 351 (D).
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The interpretation clause in the Constitution obliges the courts to ‘promote 
the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom’ and to ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights’. For instance, African, Muslim and Hindu religious and 
customary laws have not shared the prestige enjoyed by civil law concerning 
the protection of human rights.19 Clearly the courts have come to realise the 
inconsistencies in their application of the Bill of Rights pertaining to personal 
law (particularly religious law). Despite this, the courts have constantly re-
fused to legalise religious marriages. In Ryland v Edros, the court had to con-
sider whether public policy depended on the views of the majority Christian 
religion under the current Constitutional dispensation. The court concluded
‘it is quite inimical to all the values of the new South Africa that the courts should only 
brand a [Muslim marriage] contract as offensive to public policy if it is offensive to the 
values which are shared by the community at large, by all right thinking people in the 
community and not only by one section of it. It is clear, in my view, that in the Ismail 
case, the views (or presumed views) of only one [Christian] group in our plural society 
were taken into account’.20
Despite this observation, the courts still refused to give legal recognition to 
Islamic marriages. Similarly, in holding that that the consequences of any 
contract resulting from an invalid Muslim marriage may be recognised under 
certain circumstances, the court, in Amod,21 found that the new Constitution 
ushered in a new value system based on equality, religious freedom and dig-
nity (as opposed to the boni mores of society or public policy). Mahomed CJ 
observed: 
‘The insistence that the duty of support which such a serious de facto monogamous mar-
riage imposes on the husband is not worthy of protection, can only be justified on the 
basis that the only duty of support which the law will protect in such circumstances is a 
duty flowing from a marriage solemnised and recognised by one faith or philosophy to the 
exclusion of others. This is an untenable basis for the determination of the boni mores of 
society. It is inconsistent with the new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and religious freedom 
which had consolidated itself in the community even before the formal adoption of the 
interim Constitution on 22 December 1993’.22
19 Although the South African common law is a hybrid system of law, consisting partly of Dutch law, 
Roman law, and English law, religious law has been completely marginalised. Human rights and 
interpretation of law have for decades been restricted to the provisions of this hybrid system. Al-
though the courts have in the past applied some aspects of African traditional jurisprudence in their 
judgements, such trends are scarce. See, for example, the case of S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 
(CC) which applied the notion of ubuntu. Much of customary law was declared contra bonos mores 
in terms section 11(1) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. This section was repealed, but 
was re-enacted in section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 which reads: ‘Any 
court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indigenous law insofar as such law 
can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty: Provided that indigenous law shall not be 
opposed to the principles of public policy or natural justice: Provided further that it shall not be law-
ful for any court to declare that the custom of lobola or bogadi or similar custom is repugnant to such 
principles’. Hindu and Muslim personal law were constantly either rejected on the grounds of public 
policy, or ignored on the basis of legal technicality by the South African courts. See Ismael v Ismael 
supra; Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) ibida; Kalla and Another v The Master and Others .
20 Ibid at 89. 
21 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA)
22 Ibid.
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Also in Amod,23 the court expressly refused to recognise the Islamic 
marriages. Coming back to the question presented earlier: why do the South 
African courts continue to refuse to legally recognise and enforce religious 
law? The best answer is to be found in Ismail v Ismail.24 In this case, the court 
had to decide whether the consequences of a Muslim marriage, which is still 
legally unrecognised because it is regarded as potentially polygamous and 
therefore contrary to public policy, could be legally enforced upon divorce. 
Van Reenen J made the following observation: 
‘The marriage law of the State is rooted in Christianity whereas the union of plaintiff and 
defendant is based on a non-Christian faith. At the advent of Protestantism marriage 
was secularised and passed under the control of the State. However, although as a result 
of the advent of Protestantism marriage was secularised, the countries of the Reformed 
Church retained the idea of its being of divine institution in its general origin’.25
Ismael’s case was decided a decade before the Constitution with the Bill of 
Rights came into effect in South Africa, yet the courts have consistently re-
fused to recognise religious marriage law other than Christian marriages. Im-
mediately after the Interim Constitution came into operation, the court, in 
Kalla v The Master26 said that potentially polygamous marriages may contra-
vene the gender equality principle:
‘Apart from that, the principle of gender equality embodied in sections 8(2) and 119(3) 
and constitutional principles I, III and V (read with section 232(4)) may well lead to the 
conclusion that polygamous (and potential polygamous) marriages are as unacceptable 
to the mores of the New South Africa as they were to the old’.27 
Also in Amod, the court consciously refused to deal with the issue of the 
validity of a Muslim religious marriage under the current constitutional dis-
pensation, arguing that the duty of spouse support does not depend on the 
validity of a marriage:
‘For the purposes of the dependant’s action the decisive issue is not whether the depend-
ant concerned was or was not lawfully married to the deceased, but whether or not the 
deceased was under a legal duty to support the dependant in a relationship which de-
served recognition and protection at common law’.28 
4  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The purpose of Part 4 of this article is to compare the South African model 
with the legal systems of other countries, particularly those countries that 
have incorporated personal law into their mainstream legal system concern-
ing all matters pertaining to family law. The British and Indian models are 
considered. The Indian model is chosen due to similarities concerning the 
religious rights in the Indian Constitution with the South African Constitu-
tion. The British experience is relevant because South Africa inherited British 
common law.
23 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA)
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid at 1009C (par 20)
26 1994 (4) BCLR 79 (T)
27 Ibid at 89 (per Dijkhorst J)
28 Ibid at par 25
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4.1  The British experience
During the 1970s the Union of Muslim Organisations of the United Kingdom 
and Eire resolved to seek official recognition of a separate system of Muslim 
family law which was meant to apply automatically to Muslims in the United 
Kingdom.29 The resolution was, nevertheless, rejected by the British govern-
ment.30 While there may have been a number of reasons attributable to the 
rejection, it would seem that there were four main reasons that contributed to 
the resolution being regarded as ‘not appropriate’.31 
First, the resolution ran counter to the English tradition of a unified system 
in family matters irrespective of origins, race or creed. Second, there seemed 
to have been a practical difficulty of working out which system of Muslim 
law would be applicable since there are several schools of thought in Islam, 
mostly determined by the country in which it was practised. Third, would 
cases be decided by the existing civil courts or by specially established re-
ligious courts staffed exclusively by Muslims? The difficulty related to the 
controversy surrounding the interpretation of points of Muslim law by non-
Muslim judges who would not be fit to do so. Fourth, to the Western mind, 
Muslim family law contains a number of principles that violate the funda-
mental rights and freedoms set out in the international conventions, such as 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights to which the United Kingdom is a party. This is 
in relation to discrimination against women on the following grounds by per-
mitting: polygamy, forced marriages, marriages of girls below puberty, divorce 
by a unilateral repudiation by the husband (talaaq), and the ban on Muslim 
women marrying non-Muslim husbands.
The Constitution provides for the recognition of diversity and requires the 
legislature to enact laws that recognise, to a certain extent, religious and per-
sonal systems of family law.32 African customary law has already received 
such recognition, 33 and this did not cause many of the above problems be-
cause any person who does not want to be bound by customary may apply 
for a letter of exemption from customary law.34 The same rule may be applied 
to any system of personal law in South Africa. Further, the Constitution rec-
ognises courts other than the civil courts. For instance, courts of traditional 
leaders staffed by traditional leaders who perform judicial functions are cur-
29 Poulter S ‘The Claim to a Separate Islamic System of Personal Law for British Muslims’ in Mallat C 
& Connors J Islamic family law, Arab & Islamic Laws series (1990) at 147.
30 See generally Fournier P ‘The reception of Muslim family laws in western liberal states’ in Dossier 27: 
Canadian Council of Muslim Women (December 2005) available at www.wluml.org/english/
31 See generally Poulter S (fn 29 above) at 157–159.
32 See the Preamble read with section 15(3) of the Constitution supra.
33 See s 211 and s 39 the Constitution supra; Black Administration Act 38 supra; Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act supra; Recognition of Customary Marriages Act supra; Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003.
34 See s 31(1) of the Black Administration Act supra which reads: ‘In any case in which he may deem 
fit, the Governor-General may grant to any Black a letter of exemption exempting the recipient from 
Black law and custom’.
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rently operative in South Africa.35 Furthermore, the courts have already pro-
nounced on the relevance and the applicability of some of the finer points of 
personal law, and have applied the system to which the litigants belong. In 
Ryland v Edros, the court followed and applied the Islamic law in accordance 
with the Sunni jurisprudence as it was practised in the Cape.36
Lastly, the South African Constitution prohibits any form of unfair sex and 
religious discrimination.37 The South African legal system is now based on ac-
ceptance and protection of differences. It is important that this constitutional 
value finds its way through legislation that is required by the Constitution.
4.2  The Indian experience
Perhaps the best model for the development of personal laws and religious 
laws in South Africa are the developments made during post-colonial India. 
As stated above, this is mainly because post-colonial India passed a Con-
stitution with a Bill of Rights, similar (in many respects) to that of the South 
African Constitution. Further, India recognises all forms of personal laws in 
private matters38 – something which South Africa has not yet done. Article 15 
of the Constitution of India reads: 
‘15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.- 
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them … (4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of 
article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement 
of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes 
and the Scheduled Tribes.’
In India, the distinction between religious personal law, on the one hand, and 
secular law on the other, was introduced in 1772 by the British administrators.39 
While recognising that secularism had to be the cornerstone of the Indian State 
policy, the Constitution of India made both secularism and the commitment to 
legal pluralism its governing ideology.40 Further, while commercial, civil, and 
criminal matters are regulated according to secular law, family law matters, such 
as marriage and divorce, inheritance and succession are regulated in accordance 
with religious personal laws.41 The Indian model proves to be the best model for 
South Africa as both the Indian and the South African Constitutions contain pro-
visions protecting cultural and religious rights, and personal legal systems.
35 See sections 12, 20, 21A and 31of the Black Administration Act supra. In particular, s 12(1) (a) 
provides: ‘The Minister may authorize any Black chief… to hear and determine civil claims arising 
out of Black law and custom brought before him by Blacks against Blacks resident within his area of 
jurisdiction’ and section 20(1) reads: ‘The Minister may by writing under his hand confer upon any 
Black chief or headman jurisdiction to try and punish any Black who has committed … any offence 
at common law or under Black law and custom …’.
36 Ryland v Edros supra. See also Taylor v Kurtstag NO and Others 2005 (7) BCLR 705 (W) at 706
37 See s 9 of Constitution.
38 See s 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act 25 of 1955.
39 Narain V ‘Women’s rights and the accommodation of “Difference”. Muslim Women in India’ 8 S. 
Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. (1988) 43 at 49
40 Ibid 49
41 The process known as the “Islamization of Muslim law and Sanskritization of Hindu law.” See 
generally Narain, V (Fn 39) 45. See also Solanki G ‘Beyond Citizenship: State-Society Relations and 
Gender Justice in India’ Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Conference of the Canadian Political 
Science Association, York University, Canada 1–3 June 2006.
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5  CONCLUSION
Considering all the issues discussed above, one is bound to conclude that 
the South African courts have failed to ‘promote the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’. 
Further, the courts have failed to ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights’ by not recognising that religious personal law (or at least re-
ligious family law) has become part of the mainstream legal system in South 
Africa. Furthermore, the courts have failed to protect the right of different 
peoples’ to practise their religion by not recognising that the right to freedom 
of religion includes not only the mental aspects of belief, but also freedom to 
practise and have legal protection of the rules of their religion. By favouring 
the rules of the Christian faith, the courts have unfairly discrimination against 
other religions. To rectify these omissions, and to deal with such problems 
in a free and democratic society based on freedom and fundamental human 
rights, the courts must develop laws to reflect legal diversity and legal plu-
ralism as contemplated in section 15 of the Constitution. This view is also 
supported by Van Niekerk as follows: ‘Different laws have different functions 
to fulfil, functions for which they are best suited. “Other laws” need not of 
necessity be in conflict with state law; they may complement state law and 
direct the development of state law in harmony with basic values underlying 
non-state legal and social systems’.42 Clearly, there is a need for recognition 
of legal pluralism concerning matters of private law. This would be in compli-
ance with the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed in the Constitution, 
considering the fact that everyone has a right to follow a religion of their 
choice.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fournier P ‘The reception of Muslim family laws in western liberal states’ in 
Dossier 27: Canadian Council of Muslim Women (December 2005) Avail-
able at www.wluml.org/english/
Gibbon E The Decline and fall of the Roman Empire (1776) Available at www.
panarchy.org/gibbon/law
Griffiths J ‘What is legal pluralism’ Journal of Legal Pluralism (1986) NR 24, 
38
Hooker MB Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial 
Laws (1975).
Masaji C ‘The Phases of Legal Pluralism in the Contemporary World’ Ratio 
Juris Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1998)
Narain V ‘Women’s rights and the accommodation of “Difference:” Muslim 
Women in India’ 8 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. (1988)
Poulter, S ‘The Claim to a separate Islamic system of personal law for British 
Muslims’ in Mallat C and Connors J (eds) Islamic Family Law (1990)
42 Van Niekerk G ‘The plurality of legal domains in South Africa: the state’s historical legislative intru-
sion into the Field of Urban Popular Justice and Customary Law’ in Scharf W & Nina D (eds), The 
other law: non-state ordering in South Africa (2001) at 36.
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT
0664 Law Democracy and Developme130   130 12/3/07   1:30:32 PM
131
Sezgin Y ‘A new theory of legal pluralism: The case of Israeli Religious Courts’ 
Paper presented at the Association for Israel Studies, 19th Annual Meeting, 
San Diego, CA., April 27–29 (2003)
Solanki G ‘Beyond Citizenship: State–Society Relations and Gender Justice 
in India’ Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Conference of the Canadian 
Political Science Association, York University, Canada 1–3 June 2006
Van Niekerk ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Bekker, JC & Rautenbach, C & Goolam, 
NMI (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 2 ed (2006)
Van Niekerk, G ‘The plurality of legal domains in South Africa: the state’s 
historical legislative intrusion into the field of urban popular justice and 
customary law’ in Scharf, W & Nina, D (eds), The Other Law: Non-state 
Ordering in South Africa (2001)
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION
0664 Law Democracy and Developme131   131 12/3/07   1:30:33 PM
0664 Law Democracy and Developme132   132 12/3/07   1:30:33 PM
